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     This conceptual paper provides an overview of the theory and application to the practice of 
corporate governance. The evolution of corporate governance theory and definitions are 
described, taking an international perspective.  The paper offers insights at a national level into 
governance experiences within the UK, Ireland, and Cyprus.    
     The paper reviews four classic corporate governance theories most often cited in the 
literature.  Each theory is critically discussed and applied at an organisational level. The authors 
introduce language theory, sociology, psychology and organisational theory as a means of 
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uncovering the changing governance epistemologies as corporate governance is more than 
economic and legal theories. 
     A summary table outlining key foci, actors, features and critique of each model is provided 
so as to enable the reader easily identify each in practice.  The paper concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
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     One way of viewing the concept of corporate governance is to consider external and internal 
mechanisms (Brennan, 2010).  Agency theory, otherwise known as managerial theory of the 
firm, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is an early model of corporate governance and can be 
viewed as either an external or internal instrument.  Agency theory has attracted significant 
research attention over the past 40 years and today it is widely cited as an underpinning 
governance theory.  
     This paper discusses literature on the four ‘classic’ corporate governance theories and 
explores how these can be identified in practice by their underlying focus, actors, and other 
elements.  Against the background of the theory, the paper outlines there are wider influences 
beyond the organisation that provide for a more holistic approach to governance.    
     Some questions addressed in this paper are: 1. what are the respective histories of corporate 
governance in terms of theory development? 2. What is the role of governance theory in 
influencing board practices and focus?  3. As governing does not take place in a vacuum what 
other factors should be considered?  
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     The paper is structured as follows.  Firstly, the historical influences on governance, its 
definitions and language are explored.  The paper draws on four classic corporate governance 
theories; agency, stewardship, resource dependency and stakeholder theory as these are the 
most cited theories recounted in the literature.  Each of these theories in turn emphasises 
different aspect of board governance.  The researchers critique each governance theory or 
paradigm, summarising these in a table for ease of understanding.  The paper concludes with 




GOVERNANCE – ITS DEFINITIONS, HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY, AND 
LANGUAGE 
     The writers suggest that an epistemological view incorporating the diversity of views from 
sociology, psychology, histography, economics and legal theory are essential to understand 
governance.  Michel Foucault, cited in Cummings et al. (2016) proffers that the ‘past is viewed 
in terms of making sense of the present …’ (p.36).  In a similar frame the authors suggest that 
viewing governance and its supporting activities through a Foucauldian lens enables an 
understanding of the concepts and frameworks that have evolved under the governance 
umbrella that are experienced today in practice. The aim is not to recount historical accuracy 
but review the storehouse of activity that has occurred, and to in turn, understand evolving 
trends.  White (2010) states that historians deal in ‘concrete reality’ (p.192) as they seek to 
narrate their interpretation of an event and tell the story well. Alternatively, organisational 
sociologists define a form of life that portrays an interdependence in a complex society, e.g. 
market transactions in the business world (Ocasio, Mauskapf and Steele, 2016).  Sociology 
reminds us that corporate governance is not only based on economic and legal theory (Kubicek, 
3 
 
Stamfestova and Strouhal, 2016) but should be also interpreted through cultural and contextual 
lenses. Psychologists on the other hand explain governance mechanisms from the perspectives 
of the individuals involved, stressing the importance of human interaction in governance 
frameworks e.g. leadership behaviours and traits.  
    Corporate governance for the most part, may be considered as a contested, diverse and 
temporal concept, which historically has had many definitions (Cadbury 1992; Turnbull 1997; 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2004; Mahadeo 2013; L’huillier 
2014). Conventionally it was defined narrowly with the focus on the relationship of 
organisations and funders and the governance mechanisms for monitoring and control of the 
agent (Brennan, 2010). The debate continued in a search for an agreed definition, with 
researchers in healthcare, management, economics, accounting, and law being just some of the 
professional fields that have developed their own definitions.  A useful consensus and broader 
definition of governance is put forward by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2004) which defines corporate governance as involving ‘a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders’ (p.11).  
This definition portrays the organisation as an outward looking, complex social entity (Burr, 
2003) and thus fits well in the context of the climate of globalisation. The definition also fits 
with the view of governance as having both an inward and outward focus and the navigation 
of a complex system.  
     In 1932 Berle and Means published “The Modern Corporation and Private Property” and, 
whilst they did not put a name to the discipline, their contribution influenced corporate 
governance systems in the United States.   44 years later the seminal paper of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) had a similar economic related theme and was foremost in setting the 
foundations for agency theory and its relationship to the separation of the responsibilities and 
control of upper level management, board of directors and shareholders. The Jensen and 
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Meckling article has been cited more than 92,000 times demonstrating its contribution to the 
field. Whilst their article does not overtly mention corporate governance (Shah and Napier, 
2017), corporate governance at the time was based on agency theory as distinct to a wider 
stakeholder approach. These seminal works began to set the narrative and dialogue around the 
concept of corporate governance.  
     Using Saussure’s (1857-1913) approach to language and meaning demonstrates that 
variations in how words are defined can in itself leads to complexity, lack of clarity and 
misinterpretations. For example, ‘oversight’, ‘control’ or ‘authority’ are often used to explain 
‘governance’. Critics of Saussure posit that his theory on language and meaning was structured 
and ‘frozen in time’, rather than ‘changing over time’ (Leitch, 2010 p. 847).  Post structuralist 
and postmodernist philosophers, e.g. Levi-Strauss, Derrida and Eagleton further criticised 
Saussure’s theory as limiting because reviewing the language of governance without situating 
it within culture, context and time is only part of its understanding. In the idea that originated 
in Saussure, words can carry many meanings and the understanding of what words mean can 
change over time (Burr, 2003), who suggests that the meaning of words is constructed, and 
language depends on context and the interpretation given to it.  This is very much the case with 
governance. Over the past 50 years, the language of compliance, conformance, control and 
performance has shaped the governance narrative. The 1970s meanings and understandings of 
terms such as ‘oversight’, ‘control’ or ‘authority’ and ‘governance’ seem somewhat out of 
context when compared to the 2020 interpretations.   
     Societal calls and in turn a contextual need for corporate governance arose out of failings in 
high-profile corporations in Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s including Barings Bank, 
Coloroll, Maxwell Group, Polly Peck, and Parmalet.   In 2002 the combined impact of US 
financial reporting and other corporate scandals, e.g. Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, WorldCom 
and Xerox, saw the Dow Jones Index plummet.  The collapse of the Cyprus Stock Exchange, 
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also in 2002 (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006) was not of the magnitude of Enron or 
Worldcom.  Weak corporate governance in the Cypriot banking sector saw a second collapse 
of the banks in 2013, resulting in a bailout by the Troika (Michaelides, 2014).    In Ireland, the 
collapse of the Irish banking system and the ‘Celtic Tiger’ in 2008 also led to Ireland being 
‘bailed out’ by the Troika (Bielenberg, 2018).  In summary weaker public confidence and 
political concerns because of the market and organisational failures, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, were among the drivers for change and resulted in corporate governance initiatives 
being reinforced (L’Huillier, 2013). 
     The UK’s response to its scandals was a focus on the development of external mechanisms. 
In 1991 the UK established the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
led by Sir Adrian Cadbury (Johannesson et al. 2010).  The Cadbury Report (1992) and a series 
of other reports such as the Turnbull Report (Turnbull, 1999) and Higgs Review (Higgs, 2003), 
which built on the original work of Cadbury, resulted in the non-statutory 2018 Combined 
Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2018) which is in operation today.  In Cyprus, the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange introduced the Cypriot Corporate Governance Code in September 2002.  The 
research of Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) found that few firms complied with “the 
provisions of the standards and the majority did not comply at any level” p. 229, thus the early 
adoption of  a governance code for many Cypriot organisations was a mere paper exercise. 
Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) suggest that other initiatives were needed to improve 
compliance with corporate governance, including education highlighting its benefits.  Ireland 
in 1991 was the earliest adopter in Europe of a governance code (Kubicek, Stamfestova and 
Strouhal, 2016) and today it embraces the principles of the UK Combined Code.   
     Discussion will now progress to recount the development of governance theory at national 






THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNANCE THEORY  
Fundamentally, there are two international approaches to corporate governance applied at 
national level.  The Anglo Saxon model that is a non-statutory, principles based approach 
followed in many countries, including UK, Cyprus and Ireland and the rules / legislative 
approach evident in the USA.  These approaches can be aligned with a carrot and/or stick 
philosophy rewarding good and punishing bad behaviours. The principles approach follows a 
best practice ‘comply or explain’ model associated with governance codes following Cadbury 
(1992).  The US chose the legislative route with the hurried passing by Congress of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002.  US companies are obliged under Federal Law to comply 
with SOX and non-compliance can result in a court appearance.  The governance requirements 
of SOX appear to be grounded in positivist agency theory (Cohen et al. 2013).   
     The failings in the corporate world led to the external mechanisms for Corporate 
Governance described above. However, the internal mechanisms that evolved to support these 
at an organisational level must also be discussed.  There are four key theoretical models that 
summarise practical application of governance at an organisational level.  As outlined above, 
the earliest theoretical framework or model described is principal-agency theory, often simply 
referred to as agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Chambers, 2012). With its origins in 
finance and economics (L’huillier, 2014) it is concerned with relationship and control, between 
the owner and their designate.  Over time different theoretical governance models were 
proposed modifying this theory and removing the focus from the principal and agent (Freeman 
et al. 2016). Stewardship behaviour theory, originating in the disciplines of psychology and 
sociology, was next to come to prominence.  
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     In contrast to the principal-agency model, stewardship theory advances an idea whereby 
directors (and CEOs) have fiduciary duties and can be trusted and hence they should be 
empowered (Turnbull, 1997). The third framework is the resource dependency model with its 
origins in sociology and can be defined as ‘the linking role of the board to other organisations’ 
(L’huillier, 2014, p.309). In this concept networking and what the director brings to the table 
is the interest. The fourth and final framework the authors identify is stakeholder theory. Boards 
that operate a stakeholder approach look for balance between different internal and external 
stakeholders needs (Huse, 2005; Chambers, 2012; Pettersen et al. 2012; Bismark and Studdert 




APPLICATION OF GOVERNANCE MODELS TO PRACTICE  
     Having identified four models and their primary differences discussion now moves to 
exploring the key focus, factors, actors and critique of the four models.  The authors will 
identify whether each model takes an internal or external focus; what are key distinguishing 
factors associated with each model; which of the governance actors plays the central role and 
the primary relationships stressed within the models; and finally offer a critique as to the 
shortcomings in each model.  In doing so a picture of each of the four classic models evolves 
that will enable the reader to recognise which model is in operation, and to identify challenges 






     Researchers are by no means united on a definition of agency theory.  There is some degree 
of consensus on agency theory as a control and monitoring mechanism focusing inwards into 
the organisation. This is evident from the early research in legal, financial and management 
literature (Johnson et al. 1996).  The pessimistic beliefs of agency theory assume the self-
serving opportunism of management (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005).  However, this is 
critiqued as showing a simplistic view of human nature.  Boston et al. (1996) propose that 
principal-agency theory is useful for analysing public policy issues, but it would not be suitable 
for analysing complex social interactions.  Pettersen et al. (2012) report that its monitoring and 
compliance focus leads to lower performance of a board following the agency model, e.g. board 
moving from strategic discussions to focusing on budget monitoring.   In essence the critics 
suggest such boards are focused on the compliance of the now rather the strategy of tomorrow.  
A limitation of agency theory is that it has an inward focus of economic efficiency and does 
not consider those outside of the organisation who may be affected by organisation decisions 
(Brennan, 2010). Agency theory highlights the only relationship of interest is between the 
board and management (DeRegge and Eeckloo, 2020).  The absence of trust, and information 
asymmetry are core tenets in agency theory, the board do not trust management (Brennan 2010) 
and the shareholders do not trust the board, each needing to be monitored and controlled.    
     Organisations exhibiting traditional agency style board behaviour can be identified in 
practice whereby staff are being held accountable, burdened under internal reporting 
requirements to ensure compliance, and exhibit perceptions of the CEO being sandwiched, both 
upwards and downwards, in the accountability chain (Bismark and Studdert, 2013; Endacott et 
al. 2013; Freeman et al. 2016; Jones et al. 2018). Under agency theory it is assumed that 
managers (agents) may not act in a way to maximise shareholder (principal) value and hence 
managers should be controlled by the board and have little discretionary power (L’huillier, 
2014).  Some authors suggest that agency theory can be identified in the public sector reforms 
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in the UK of 20 years ago and the introduction of managerialism, bureaucracy and loss of 
autonomy.   
 
Stewardship Theory 
     Stewardship theory is an early challenger of the agency theory perspective (vanEes, 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009) and the agency theory view of the relationships between 
management and the board.  Whilst agency theory is dominated by the economics and finance 
disciplines, stewardship theory is dominated by the disciplines of social psychology, 
organisational theory, and psychology.   Here, the CEO / General Manager is identified as a 
key internal actor on the governance stage and whereas agency theory assumes information 
asymmetry, the stewardship model assumes the CEO is trustworthy (vanEes, Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2009).  Later studies discuss governance behaviours related to stewardship theory as 
boards attempting to implement a model of shared values built on high trust (Millar et al. 2015; 
Veronesi et al. 2015; Freeman et al. 2016; Pronovost et al. 2018).   
     This concept of shared values includes the importance of balanced monitoring and reporting 
of both hard information (in the form of financial reports, KPI dashboards and scorecards and 
national benchmarks) and soft intelligence (in the form of board walkarounds, staff stories and 
experiences), (Jiang et al. 2009;  Jha and Epstein, 2010; Freeman et al. 2016; Mannion et al. 
2017).  Implied trust of the CEO is associated with early stewardship theory whilst later 
evolutions of this theory identified CEO behaviours that recognise the importance of a rounded 
approach to knowledge generation via the provision of hard and soft information on which trust 
and confidence is fostered. 
     Organisations exhibiting stewardship style board behaviour can be identified in practice 
whereby a collaborative approach between management and boards who delegate authority and 
responsibilities to the CEO is evidenced. The board assumes that motives of management are 
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aligned with the objectives of the board and shareholders (Brennan, 2010). Focus on 
compliance is reduced, resulting from the fostering of trust. The CEO role under stewardship 
theory has visibly evolved to become a conduit between the board, shareholder, and employee.  
The CEO is the voice of the organisation with a strong visible presence.  Under this theory the 
CEO is seen as a steward, a team player, and not as an agent or opportunist.  
     These first two theories have approached corporate governance via the relationship between 
management and the board, with agency theory seeking to control management’s self-interest 
while stewardship theory considers management and board motives to be aligned (DeRegge 
and Eeckloo, 2020).  Whilst both these are theories of inward facing governance, the next two 
theories shift the focus outwards and take a broader perspective of corporate governance (Huse, 
2005). 
 
Resource Dependency Theory 
     Empirical data suggests boards have a wider role than espoused by agency theory (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles 2005) and stewardship theory, suggesting that board members can also 
give advice, open doors to new relationships and enhance strategy.  Resource dependency 
theory emphases external relationships as these can used to leverage advantage (DeRegge and 
Eeckloo, 2020). The premise of resource dependency theory is that organisations seek to make 
links and connections for the achievement of the organisation goals (vanEes, Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2009). In industries that have been studied and espouse to resource dependency there is 
evidence of board members who bring human capital, in the form of specialist expertise, 
experience and knowledge and relational capital, in networking and external stakeholder 
associations into the boardroom. There is solid evidence in the literature of boards exhibiting 
these competencies and behaviours and demonstrating high performance activity in governing 
with both an inward and external focus on the achievement of goals (Jiang et al. 2009; Jha and 
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Epstein, 2010; Freeman et al. 2016; Mannion et al. 2017). Having these skillsets at the board 
table is key for managing internal and external relationships and for acquiring resource and 
strategic advantage.  
     However, other researchers of this governance behaviour demonstrate conflicting views. As 
a caveat Hicks Midanek (2018) cautions that it is important to establish the appropriate tone at 
the top and ‘Explicitly include screening for people’s character as well as competence’ as 
‘corporate reputations can be destroyed in an instant’ (p. 176).   L’huillier (2014) argues, based 
on the theory of Hung (1978) and the earlier findings of Mace (1971), that resource dependency 
behaviour theory should be viewed from a critical perspective and cautions that the human 
resources could demonstrate power via their ‘old boys network and school tie brigade’ (p. 310).  
L’huillier’s (2014) critique was based on a governance study that is almost 50 years old.  It 
does nevertheless provide a critical and balancing perspective which is quite different to the 
discussion on behaviours described earlier in the paragraph.    
     Organisations exhibiting resource dependency style board behaviour can be identified in 
practice by their strategic co-option of board members from influential networks, banking, 
politics and similar domains.   Boards characterising resource dependency seek to bolster board 
strength by including the right participants in the boardroom (Stock, 2018). This may be 
achieved through formal connections, especially with financial institutions on the theory that 
such connections may facilitate access to cashflow for the organisation (Johnston et al. 1996).   
 
Stakeholder Theory 
     The final concept is stakeholder theory which traces its origins to management theory, 
politics and law (L’huillier, 2014). Again, there is no consensus on the definition of stakeholder 
theory and it is loosely defined in the literature.  Researchers generally agree that it is about a 
balancing act with boards taking a pluralist approach where stakeholders interests are 
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considered alongside the interests of funders and employees.  Stakeholder theory takes a 
broader perspective on corporate governance as it focusses on the interests of each stakeholder 
in the governance process. DeRegge and Eeckloo (2020); Huse (2005) argue for this 
inclusiveness and recognise that stakeholders may be internal or external actors. Pettersen et 
al. (2012) and Malfait et al. (2017) stress boards need to secure the interests of stakeholders 
and looked at involving stakeholders in decision making processes.  The research of Mannion 
et al. (2017) acknowledges that organisations have overlapping stakeholder interests, both co-
operative and competitive, and suggest these overlapping interests can be addressed in an 
integrated and balanced fashion. 
     Freeman et al. (2018) considers the tensions in stakeholder theory and asks the question ‘Is 
stakeholder theory primarily aimed at creating value for all involved or at creating value for 
the firm?’ (p. 210).  This question led Freeman et al. (2018) to ponder who is all. The article 
discussed ethics and how much of ethics is concerned with political theory.  As seen above in 
the resource dependency model, many board appointments may be construed as having 
political undertones.  Huse (2005) cautions of a dominant coalition of stakeholders in the board 
room and the challenges this may bring. 
     Organisations exhibiting stakeholder style board governance behaviour can be identified in 
practice by their broad representation in the boardroom, including the appointment of 
employees as directors. In Ireland, the composition of board membership in recent years 
demonstrates an increase in the use of this model in areas such as professional regulation and 
statutory and not for profit boards. Indeed, internationally issues such gender balance, ethnic 
minority representation, diversity and inclusion are all very much to the fore. These trends in 
behaviour are indicators of stakeholder theory.  
     The latter two theories discussed above, resource dependency theory and stakeholder 
theory, have as their focus the linking of the organisations with the external environment in 
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which the organisation is situated.  These theories do not place as much a focus on the 
individual (e.g. agent or steward) as is the case with the first two theories. Agency theory is 
still the dominant governance theory and it is the starting point for building an understanding 




VISUALISING GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE 
     Drawing on the theory and examples of practice in the earlier sections of the article, Table 
1 below represents the key ideas in each of the four classic models and has been developed as 
an easy to use tool to aid understanding, identification and classification of governance 
concepts observed in practice.   
  
 Agency  Stewardship  Resource 
Dependency  
Stakeholder  
Popularised in  1970’s 1980’s 1980’s 2000’s 
Key focus of theory   Inward  Inward Inwards and 
Outward 
Outward 
Key actors in the 
governance model 
(Bold emphasis 
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Key critique of the 
governance model 
Explicit lack of 
trust  
Financial focus to 
the determent of 








Old Boys club 
may lead to 
exclusion of 
persons or groups 











as their interests 
may be omitted 
TABLE 1. GOVERNANCE THEORIES SUMMARY AND RECOGNISING THEORIES IN PRACTICE   
 
     To effectively understand corporate governance, it is important to recognise that contextual 
issues have shaped its development to date.  As demonstrated by the summary points of Table 
1, the internal control focus of the 1970s and 1980s made the agency model a suitable approach 
for the time, especially following the scandals in Europe and overseas.  In the multicultural 
diverse society at the turn of the 21st century a new model for governance was shaped to be 
reflective of increased calls for participative governance.  In making sense of current 
governance practice, the authors highlight the contribution of governance models of the past 
including their inherent shortfalls and how these have evolved and enabled an understanding 
of the current pluralist perspective. The reader is again reminded of the words of Foucault that 
the ‘past is viewed in terms of making sense of the present …’ (Cummings et al. 2016, p.36). 
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     As the world wrestles with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is prudent to reflect on past and 
current models as these are likely to evolve once more.  Indeed, the authors argue that the 
COVID-19 pandemic is once more changing the governance routines for many organisations. 
Boards must now serve more than the shareholders and investors in this time of complexity 
and change.  They are required to truly take a pluralist approach and consider the advice of 
non-traditional boardroom actors such as public health specialists, scientists, social media 
influencers and a raft of others.  While at the same time continuing to engage with the 
traditional actors such as the banks, funders, staff and customers and clients.  As the concept 
of the stakeholder is again at a crossroads and being redefined by COVID-19, the language of 
governance will likely evolve in the coming decade in response to the multiplicity of factors. 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, (2005) also argue for the progress of the corporate governance 





     In this paper a chronological / historical perspective of how governance theory has evolved 
over the last 50 years has identified that different governance theories are not ‘a string of 
isolated pearls but a mosaic in which each work fits into a larger frame’ (Leitch 2010, pg. 
xxxiv). The theoretical foundations of the language and meaning of governance has been 
examined, identifying the different lens through which the theory is espoused.  It became 
evident how the language of governance and the influence of corporate governance on board 
practices has changed from a ‘control’ ‘information asymmetry’ and ‘agency’ approach in the 
earliest theory to ‘collaboration’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘voice of the customer’ approach in 
stakeholder theory.    
16 
 
     The concept of pluralism in a wider sense is proposed, suggesting that rather than one 
dominant theory, a hybrid of all four theories is critical to progress the corporate governance 
agenda.  Like others, the authors argue not for an either-or approach to one theory being more 
valid than another but rather linking governance models to develop a multi theoretical 
approach.  How external and internal mechanisms are enacted in practice by organisations have 
been reinterpreted over the decades. Corporate governance, whilst having its foundations in 
academic exercises, is indeed an organisational attribute that has shown itself worthy of its 
place within the language, culture and context.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
     The corporate governance discussion set out above may inspire researchers to undertake 
further research in this area.  Some recommendations for consideration are as follows: 
Understanding the historical changes in governance is important as it sets the scene for 21st 
century governance.   Given the dearth of published research on governance mechanisms in 
Cyprus, now is the time to shift the scholarly governance debate from the UK, USA, Australia 
and Canada.  Researchers should conduct research in Cypriot organisations to determine the 
operational governance model and explore the relationship to organisational performance. 
     Much research in the area of corporate governance is focussed on quantitative research of 
the formal structures and mechanisms of boards, however there is also the informal, softer side 
of corporate governance which is often ignored in academic writing. This softer side of 
governance relates to the process and practices of governing and has been referred by Huse 
(2005) as the ‘opening of the black box’ on board behaviour. Whilst there are some studies 
which use qualitative research techniques further work is needed in this area to enlighten the 
picture of corporate governance. 
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     In response to COVID and other unexpected PESTLE factors boards need to be adaptive 
and creative in their approach to change.  To do this boards need directors and leaders with a 
different skillset. This is an area of governance that warrants empirical investigation. Future 
studies could explore the implications of how boards have responded to the pandemic and if 
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